Doctor of Philosophy by Borazan, Ahmad Abdulkader
THREE ESSAYS ON INCOME DISTRIBUTION IN 
THE U.S. ECONOMY  
by 
Ahmad Abdulkader Borazan 
A dissertation submitted to the faculty of 
The University of Utah 
in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of 
Doctor of Philosophy 
Department of Economics 
The University of Utah 
August 2017 
Copyright © Ahmad Abdulkader Borazan 2017 
All Rights Reserved 
T h e  U n i v e r s i t y  o f  U t a h  G r a d u a t e  S c h o o l
STATEMENT OF DISSERTATION APPROVAL 
The dissertation of Ahmad Abdulkader Borazan 
has been approved by the following supervisory committee members: 
 Thomas N. Maloney , Chair 3/23/2017 
Date Approved 
 Matías Vernengo , Member 3/23/2017 
Date Approved 
 Minqi Li , Member 3/23/2017 
Date Approved 
 Codrina Rada von Arnim , Member 3/23/2017 
Date Approved 
 Richard Fowles , Member 3/23/2017 
Date Approved 
 
and by Thomas N. Maloney , Chair of 
The Department  of Economics 
and by David B. Kieda, Dean of The Graduate School. 
ABSTRACT 
The dissertation is composed of three papers that tackle income-distribution issues 
through three episodes of the U.S. economy.  The first essay investigates the dynamics of 
income distribution, debt, and growth applying a post-Keynesian approach to the era 
leading to the Great Depression.  It uses the single equation error correction model 
method to determine the demand regime of the 1900–1929 period.  The second paper sets 
up a model that incorporates income distribution and the accelerator relationship to 
explain investment behavior in the 1960–2015 period.  It uses time series techniques to 
explore the statistical causality among investment spending, profit share, and capacity 
utilization.  The third essay investigates the drivers of the Farmers Protest Movement in 
the late 19th century.  It investigates the trends of the farmers’ consumption habits, 
income, and production prices, in addition to the dynamics of land market.  It concludes 
that the farmers were worse off economically, which explains their protest movement in 
the late 19th century.  
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
This dissertation examines issues related to income distribution in the U.S. 
economy through three episodes from the late 19th century to the present.  Although 
David Ricardo claimed income distribution to be the main problem of political economy, 
the prominence of the neoclassical marginal revolution since 1890s and the neoclassical 
synthesis in post–World War II relegated income distribution to unimportance in 
comparison to the study of exchange and production. 
In these schools, distribution became endogenous to technical change and 
production and was seen as determined by the supply and demand of factors of 
production and their marginal productivity.  In the meantime, Cambridge Keynesians and 
others, such as Michal Kalecki and Piero Sraffa, revived the importance of studying 
income distribution and its interrelationships growth.  But their views were increasingly 
dismissed and excluded from mainstream journals since middle of 1970s. 
The study of income distribution regained importance in the last decade with the 
drastic rise of income inequality, the 2008 crisis of the capitalist system, and the obvious 
failure of trickledown economics.  However, the developmental literature of the World 
Bank and mainstream economics circles mainly focuses on the supply side effects of 
rising income inequality and poverty. 
2 
Recently within mainstream economics circles, there has been a stream of thought 
that exogeonized income distribution, such as the work of Acemoglu, Naidu, Restrepo, 
and Robinson (2013), that asserts political system structures affect income distribution 
either through property rights or through repressive measures against wages and labor 
unions.  Yet there has been no formalized attempt to understand the effect of income 
distribution on growth from the demand side.  This dissertation reviews post-Keynesian 
literature and offers two papers as an attempt to apply the post-Keynesian perspective to 
two different time periods. 
The first paper, “On the Way to the Great Depression: The Demand Regime of 
the American Economy (1900–1929),” builds on the demand regime literature which 
links income distribution to growth through the channel of aggregate demand.  The paper 
covers a period of time that has not been previously studied, and it applies a model based 
on Kaldor’s late works (1970, 1988) to conceptualize two possibilities of the demand 
regime in a private closed-economy. 
A demand regime could only be wage-led or debt-led, meaning that aggregate 
demand could be expanded to stimulate output only by increasing the wage share or the 
private debt level in the economy.  Profit-led demand regimes are not considered possible 
because investment in this model is derived from demand and strongly responsive to the 
change in capacity utilization rather than profits.  Based on a post-Keynesian model, I 
utilize available historical data to construct wage share, profit share, consumer debt, and 
investment debt time series for the relevant period. 
Then, I use a single-equation error correction model to estimate the coefficient of 
wage share and debt for private consumption and investment in order to determine the 
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demand regime for the period. 
I find private aggregate demand of the pre–Great Depression era to be wage-led, 
with an important role for private debt.  Furthermore, the increase of income inequality 
during the Roaring Twenties led to the rise of destabilizing channels that sustained strong 
demand, while contributing to the fragility of the system on the path to the Great 
Depression. 
In the second paper, coauthored with Matías Vernengo, we present a formalized 
version of the Kaldorian model in a closed economy.  This model implies a demand 
regime in which government spending can propel up aggregate demand in a wage-led 
demand regime. In this model a wage-led growth strategy is the only feasibly sustainable 
growth strategy, as investment is mainly derived demand.  Then, we use the Toda-
Yamamoto (1995) Granger Causality test procedure to examine the Granger causality 
among investment share of output, capacity utilization, and profit share of output of U.S. 
nonfinancial corporates for the years, 1960–2015.  We find that while capacity utilization 
does Granger-cause investment share of output, while profit share does not Granger-
cause investment share of output. 
In the third paper, I study the 19th century and examine the implications of the 
decline of price level on farmers, which constituted an important part of the economy in 
terms of production and labor force.  The third paper tackles the question concerning 
income distribution in the late 19th century, specifically, the question of whether the 
farmers’ Populist protest movement was due to worsening income level and economic 
conditions. 
The paper is an attempt to refute the claim of Douglas North (1966) that the 
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farmers’ economic condition was not deteriorating during the deflation wave (1873–
1896), and their protest movement was rather driven by the decline in their status.  I 
contest Douglas North’s (1966) revisionist claim, and utilize T.M. Adams’s (1944) 
detailed study of Vermont farmers’ incomes and spending, and other historical price 
series to show that wholesale farm prices declined further than farmers’ consumer goods 
prices, resulting in farmers being economically worse off during the whole period. 
Finally, I examine the farmland market and demonstrate that North’s use of land 
price increase as evidence of improving farmers’ economic well-being is untenable.  This 
paper revives the economic hardship thesis as an explanation of the farmers’ populist 
movement.
CHAPTER 2 
ON THE WAY TO THE GREAT DEPRESSION: THE DEMAND 
REGIME OF THE AMERICAN ECONOMY (1900–1929) 
Abstract
This paper investigates the dynamics of income distribution and economic growth 
in the United States in the era before the Great Depression.  Based on a post-Keynesian 
model, I estimate the effects of the wage share and private debt on aggregate demand for 
private domestic output. The model I used draws on Nikolas Kaldor’s later work and 
Minsky to develop a model that captures the interplay among private debt, income 
distribution, and demand. I used the error correction model to determine the demand 
regime of the period. The results of the study show the demand regime was wage-led 
with private debt playing a considerable role in driving aggregate demand.  I combine 
functional income distribution with personal income distribution to analyze the dynamics 
of distribution and demand in the Roaring Twenties. Furthermore, I argue that increased 
income inequality led to the rise of destabilizing channels that propped up demand which 
contributed to increasing economic fragility leading to the Great Depression. 
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Introduction
The paper employs a post-Keynesian framework to determine the demand regime 
of the United States in the pre–Great Depression era and finds the demand regime to be 
wage-led, with an important role played by private debt.  Furthermore, it shows how the 
increase of income inequality during the Roaring Twenties led to the rise of destabilizing 
channels that propped up demand, while contributing to the fragility of the economy on 
the path to the Great Depression. 
Following the pioneering models of Michal Kalecki and the Cambridge post-
Keynesians, Bhaduri and Marglin (1990) theorized a framework to determine whether a 
demand regime is profit-led or wage-led.  In a wage-led system, an increase in wages 
boosts demand for goods and services and thereby fosters greater economic growth.  In a 
profit-led system, in contrast, higher profits drive higher demand for investment goods 
and productive capacity building, which leads to higher growth of output in the economy. 
Inspired by the framework of Bhaduri and Marglin, most studies of demand regimes have 
covered the post–World War II period.  In spite of the claims of its similarities to current 
income distribution and growth dynamics, none have studied the era before the Great 
Depression.  The demand regime of the pre-Great Depression era is a gap in the literature 
that this work attempts to fill. 
While the majority of demand regime studies have been based on either neo-
Kaleckian or Goodwin models, I draw on the later works of Nickolas Kaldor and Minkey 
to investigate the dynamics of aggregate demand, debt, and income distribution in the 
early 20th century.  In a Kaldorian model, investment is derived demand and in a closed 
economy either wage-led or debt-led demand regimes are possible. 
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Utilizing available historical data and using statistical methods, I constructed time 
series of wage share, consumer debt, and investment debt for the relevant period.  I then 
used a single-equation error correction model to estimate the elasticity coefficients of 
wage share and debt variables for private consumption and investment to determine the 
demand regime for the period. 
In this paper, income distribution and demand dynamics are discussed for the 
period preceding the Great Depression, an era characterized as “the Roaring Twenties.” I 
argue that the drop in demand that could have been caused by the rise of income 
inequality was compensated for by two destabilizing channels.  The first was a real estate 
boom (1922–1926) financed by higher levels of mortgage debt.  The second was a 
consumer debt boom that sustained aggregate demand in the second half of the Roaring 
Twenties, but was responsible for the drop in demand in the Great Depression. 
The sections of the paper include: “Theoretical Background,” “Historical Trends 
(1900–1920),” “The Empirical Model,” “Estimation of Elasticity,” “The Roaring 
Twenties,” and “Conclusion.” 
Theoretical Background
This paper is framed within the classical Keynesian tradition.  The model is 
classical in the sense that income distribution matters and exogenously determined.  
Prominent classical economist David Ricardo (1951) defined the main question that 
political economy pursues as an enquiry into the determinants of income distribution 
among classes.  Karl Marx (1981) also underlined the importance of income distribution 
in his analysis of the contradictions of the capitalist system.  With the marginalist 
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revolution of the late 19th century taking a microlevel approach to economic problems, 
income distribution was endogenized and became an outcome of relative scarcity of 
factors of production.  The importance of investigating income distribution was recovered 
in the hands of Piero Sraffa, Michal Kalecki, and the Cambridge post-Keynesians.  This 
revival underscored the importance of understanding the economy on a class base, and 
revitalized the role of class conflict and income distribution in explaining economic 
reality (De Vroey, 1975). 
John Maynard Keynes did not address income distribution substantially, but he 
was the most significant advocate of a demand-driven theory of output and employment.  
Before Keynes the dominant theory in explaining the level of output was Say’s law: 
“supply creates its own demand.”  Keynes (1936) strongly refuted this proposition and 
maintained that output and employment levels are determined rather by the level of 
aggregate demand in the economy.  Michal Kalecki, who developed a demand- driven 
theory of output determination in Polish before Keynes, incorporated income distribution 
and demand theory in his 1942 article maintaining that, while income distribution is 
exogenously determined, aggregate demand is affected by income distribution and output 
adjusts to the change in aggregate demand (Palley, 2005). 
Nickolas Kaldor, drawing upon Kalecki (1942) and Joan Robinson (1956), 
proposed that income distribution is determined by output (Kaldor, 1955).  Starting from 
equality of savings to investment, and assuming that workers do not save out of their 
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    (2.1) 
where Y is output at full employment, P is profit, 𝐼 is investment, and  𝑆𝑝 is propensity to 
save out of profit. 
This equation implies the profit share of income is determined by the investment 
share of full employment output.  This equation is satisfied only in a full employment 
situation, however, a condition Keynes showed not normally to be the outcome of the 
dynamics of the capitalist system. Furthermore, the equation is based on equality between 
savings and an autonomous function of investment, which ignores the effect of 
investment on capacity of production Pérez Caldentey and Vernengo (2013). 
Influenced by his engagement in policymaking and practical economic problems 
(Palumbo, 2009), in his later works (1970, 1988), Kaldor emphasized the role of demand 
in driving investment.  Whereas Keynes maintained the importance of effective demand 
in the short run, Kaldor also expanded the role of demand in determining output in the 
long run.  In 1988 he stated: 
Since under the stimulus of growing demand capacity of all sectors will be 
expanded through additional investment, there are no long-run limits to growth on 
account of supply constraints; such constraints, whether due to capacity shortage 
or to local labor shortage, are essentially short-run phenomena – at any one time, 
they are a heritage of the past.  (Kaldor, 1988, p. 157) 
1 Luigi Pasinetti (1962) reached the equation without assuming workers’ 
propensity to save as zero, and reformulated it into what is known as the Cambridge 
equation.
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Kaldor (1970, 1988) incorporated the super-multiplier concept of Hicks (1950) in 
explaining the effect of effective demand on output.  The super-multiplier concept 
combines two processes.  The first is the Keynesian multiplier, by which an increase in 
autonomous spending leads to an increase of output, and through a chain reaction, higher 
output induces higher spending, which leads to further output growth.  The other process 
of the super-multiplier relation is the accelerator principle, whereby investment is mainly 
derived demand; where an increase of output and capacity utilization leads capitalists to 
invest to enhance production capacity, thus maintaining excess capacity to keep up with 
unforeseen demand.  Although Kaldor talked about the foreign trade multiplier in which 
export is the only autonomous demand, Heinrich Bortis (1997) in his formulation of the 
super-multiplier considers both exports and government spending as the components of 
autonomous demand. 
Following Bhaduri and Marglin (1990), three types of models have been used in 
determining the demand regime for different sets of countries: 
1. Goodwin model: Based on Richard Goodwin’s (1967) growth model, which
adopts a common Marxist position of a positive relationship between profit and
investment, Barbosa-Filho and Tylor (2006) framed the question in a predator–
prey model and employed a vector auto regression (VAR) model to determine the
type of demand system between 1948 and 2002.  They found that it was profit-
led.  Rada and Kiefer (2016) studied the distributional dynamics of economic
activity for a panel of countries in the Organization for Economic Co-operation
and Development (OECD) in the last 4 decades and found that the demand regime
for the group was weakly profit-led.
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2. Neo-Kaleckian models: In these models, Stockhammer and Onaran (2013) adopt
Kalecki’s position on the possibly expansionist role of an increase in wage share
and a wage-led system, although they also recognize the possibility of a profit-led
system when investment is highly sensitive to profits.  Naastepad and Storm
(2006) studied the demand regimes in eight OECD countries between 1960 and
2000.  Whereas in France, Germany, the Netherlands, Italy, Spain, and the United
Kingdom, demand regimes were wage-led, they found the demand regimes in the
US and Japan to be profit-led.
3. Kaldorian model: Unlike the neo-Kaleckian models whose investment function
is partially autonomous, Pérez Caldentey and Vernengo (2013) argued for a
model that is based on the later work of Kaldor (1970) in which investment is a
derived demand; what drives a higher rate of investment is mainly the need to
enhance production capacity to keep up with an increase in demand as reflected
in an increased capacity utilization.  The effect of output on investment is
captured by the accelerator part of Hicks’s (1950) super- multiplier relation.
Freitas and Serrano (2015) developed a model of Sraffian multiplier in which
investment is induced expenditure and income distribution is exogenous.  The
models are thus distinguished by both the investment function and the possible
type of demand regime.2
The demand regime in both the neo-Kaleckian and Kaldorian models could be 
2 For a recent review of the distinction between Kaleckian and Goodwin models, 
see Stockhammer and Stehrer (2011).  For the Kaldorian models, see Setterfield (2011) 
and Pérez Caldentey and Vernengo (2013). For a comprehensive review, see (Blecker, 
2016). 
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wage-led.  Where they differ is in the investment function; the neo-Kaleckian investment 
function is partially autonomous and responds positively to profits.  The Kaldorian 
investment function is derived demand and gives a prominent role to the accelerator 
effect of output growth.  As output grows and production capacity is highly utilized, 
investors increase their spending to keep up with higher demand. 
Another difference between the neo-Kaleckian models and the Kaldorian models 
is the case of repressed wage share, where declining wages cannot finance an increase in 
demand.  Neo-Kaleckian models recognize positive effects of profits on investment and 
propose the possibility of a profit-led system.  In Kaldorian models, in contrast, the 
profit-led system is not a possibility, as investment is mainly derived demand and an 
increase of demand in times of repressed wages could be financed only through an 
increase in debt.  Another difference between these two models is that neo-Kaleckian 
models predict a “crisis of accumulation” in wage-led regimes in the long run, as 
investment responds negatively to a decline in profits (Bhaduri & Marglin, 1990), which 
means that demand adjusts to supply and not the opposite.  Kaldorian models do not 
foresee this possibility as investment is derived demand and both output and capacity 
adjust to autonomous demand through the super-multiplier mechanism. 
Debt enters the picture as it finances private consumption, when a decline in the 
wage share, in addition to social and institutional changes, could drive consumers to 
maintain high spending level sustained more borrowing (Cynamon & Fazzari, 2008).  
However, higher consumer debt also leads to increase in debt-income ratio which tends to 
constrain consumer spending (Pressman & Scott, 2009).  Furthermore, investment debt 
interaction with private investment is characterized is a Miskyian cyclical pattern (Palley, 
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2005).  Capital accumulation expands firms’ need for external finance, and as companies 
financial position deteriorates their debt/income ratio rise, and the economy falls into a 
debt-burden regime (Nishi, 2012).  
In conclusion, since the Kaldorian model eliminates the possibility of profit-led 
demand, in our model the increase of demand for goods and services in a private closed 
economy can only be actualized through the channels of higher wage share and private 
debt. Hence we can recognize either wage-led or debt-led demand regimes. 
Historical Trends (1900–1929)
In the period from 1900 to 1929, the U.S. economy completed the full 
transformation into an industrial economy, with the deployment of the mass assembly 
line as the mode of production.  By 1929, only 20% of the labor force was engaged in 
agriculture, compared with 40% at the beginning of the 20th century.  The period was 
characterized by intense class warfare that increasingly emboldened the position of labor 
against capital in the first 2 decades.  By 1921, however, employers, with significant help 
from the judicial system, succeeded in containing and undermining the labor movement 
(Dubofsky & Dulles, 2010).  This brought an increase in income inequality, indicated by 
the increase in the share of income of the top 1% and the top 10% of income earners, who 
captured 23.9% and 49.3% of total income, respectively, in 1928 (Piketty, 2014).  Also in 
an analogy with the trends of income distribution post-1980, there was rising wage 
inequality within the class of wage earners; the top 10% of wage earners obtained 29.2% 
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of the total wage bill in 1929.3 
Furthermore, in manufacturing, which was the leading economic sector, the ratio 
of wages of white-collar workers to those of blue-collar workers was rising (Figure 2.1).  
Whereas the share of white- collar workers in value-added manufacturing output was 
steady at around 11% between 1919 and 1929, the wage share of blue-collar workers 
declined from 40 to 35% in the same period (Goldin & Katz, 1999).4  Another important 
development was the rise of wage workers in relation to self-employed workers, 
accompanying the decline in the farming sector and the achievement of full- scale 
industrialization.   
Output growth throughout the period increased annually by an average of 3.5% 
(Figure 2.2) (Tables 2.1, 2.2), but was also characterized by severe fluctuations due to the 
absence of the stabilizing influence of government and financial regulation, both of 
which were installed in the aftermath of the Great Depression.  Meanwhile, the whole 
period was characterized by high nonfarm unemployment, averaging 7.7% (Figure 2.3).   
The period from 1900 to 1929 witnessed growth in the importance of durable 
goods as consumption items.  Many household items such as cars, radios, washing 
machines, and refrigerators were introduced in this period.  Accompanying this trend was 
the rise of consumer credit arrangements and agencies such as installment finance 
companies, credit unions, and even commercial banks, which were willing to provide 
3 The wage share of the top 10% of wage earners declined after World War II, not 
recovering the 1929 level until 1984 (Piketty, 2014, pp. 298–300). 
4 “The value added of an establishment was calculated by subtracting the cost of 
materials, supplies, containers, fuels, purchased electric energy, and contract work from 
the value of shipments for products manufactured plus miscellaneous receipts for services 
rendered” (Atack & Bateman, 2006).   
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credit for consumption purposes (Nugent, 1939) (Figure 2.4).  
Corporate debt increased steadily throughout this period, from 110% of 
investment spending at the beginning of the period up to a six fold increase in investment 
spending in 1928 (Figure 2.5).  Farm mortgage debt also rose noticeably; mortgage debt 
as a percentage of the value of land and buildings rose from 27% in 1910 to 40% in 1930 
(Olmstead & Rhode, 2006) (Figure 2.6).  Nonfarm mortgage debt was gradually 
increasing up to 1914, but starting in 1918, it increased significantly (Figure 2.7).   
The overall private debt to output ratio increased from 1900 to World War I and 
resumed its acceleration tendency after the war and through the Roaring Twenties (Figure 
2.8).   
The Empirical Model
Drawing upon the later works of Kaldor (1970, 1988), the aim of this dissertation 
is to define the demand regime that best describes the dynamics of income distribution 
and aggregate demand in the United States during the pre-1929 period.  As government 
spending and international trade were not significant relative to other private 
consumption and investment in this period, the model of a private closed economy is not 
a significantly distorting abstraction from the actual economy.5   
The Keynesian private domestic equilibrium equation is: 
𝑌 = 𝑋 = 𝐶 + 𝐼 (2.1) 
where Y is private output, X is aggregate demand, C is private consumption, and I is 
5 Exports of goods and services share of GDP were 5% on average through the 
whole period, while net exports on average were below 5%. 
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private investment.  
Private consumption
In a Keynesian framework, consumption is a function of income. Although 
consumption comes from both profits and wages, consistent empirical tests show 
significantly higher marginal propensity to consume out of wages relative to profits 
(Stockhammer, Onaran, & Ederer, 2009).  Furthermore, Cynamon and Fazzari (2008) 
showed that social and cultural norms interacting with a change in household finance 
could give a rise to debt-financed consumption spending. So, consumption is a function 
of income, wage share, and debt. The private consumption equation is: 
𝐶 = 𝛼 +  𝛽 𝑌 + 𝜏 𝑊 + 𝜐 𝑁 (2.2) 
where Y is output, W is wage share and N is consumer debt; α is autonomous 
consumption, and 𝛽 , 𝜏, and 𝜐  are consumption spending coefficients for the independent 
variables.   
Private investment
In the Kaldorian model, the main variables that are assumed to determine 
investment spending are capacity utilization, wage share, and debt. 
𝐼 = 𝜇 𝑈 + 𝜛 𝑊 + 𝜀 𝑍 (2.3) 
where U is capacity utilization ratio, W is wage share, and Z is investment debt; μ, ϖ, and 
ε are coefficients of the independent variables. 
Capacity utilization is the ratio of current output to potential output.  It captures 
the accelerator effect, which is the effect of output on investment.  Assuming a fixed ratio 
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of capital to potential output in the long run, current output to fixed capital ratio could 
stand for current capacity utilization.  Wage share captures the income distribution effect.  
Furthermore, wage share rather than profit share was chosen as the distributive variable 
in the investment equation because in a Kaldorian model there is no place for a profit-led 
system; investment is derived demand. The debt variable included in the investment 
equation is investment debt, which equals the total of corporate debt and mortgage debt; 
it captures the effect of debt on investment. The driver of accumulating household debt to 
finance residential investment is the same motive of households to spend accumulate debt 
as maintained by Cynamon and Fazzari (2008), and Pressman and Scott (2009). The debt-
business investment nexus is based on the Minskyian concept of a cycle with tranquil and 
turbulent phases. In the tranquil phase, investors’ appetite for investment and borrowing 
is accommodated by the financial sector, leading to growth in investment spending 
accompanied with accumulation of business debt. This opens the door for financial 
fragility with the rising debt-income ratio and firms’ worsening balance sheet position, 
ending in a bust or boom of debt financed investment spending (Palley, 1994). 
Consolidating Equations 2.2 and 2.3, the model states that aggregate demand is a 
function of the exogenous variables of autonomous consumption, income distribution, 
and debt.  Where wage share is the crucial distributional variable: 
𝑋 = 𝑓(𝐴, 𝑊, 𝐷) (2.4) 
where 𝑋 is aggregate demand, A is autonomous consumption,  𝑊 is wage share, and 𝐷 is 
private debt level. 
According to the dynamics of aggregate demand, wage share, and private debt, in 
the case of positive debt elasticity of aggregate demand, ΕD >0, we can recognize four 
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cases: 
If the wage elasticity of aggregate demand is positive, ΕW > 0, then: 
(1) When |ΕW|>|ΕD|, we have wage-led demand.
(2) When |ΕW|<|ΕD|, we have debt-led demand.
If wage elasticity of aggregate demand is negative, ΕW < 0, then:
(3) When |ΕW|>|ΕD|, we have a capital-strike position.
(4) When |ΕW|<|ΕD|, we have debt-led demand.
In the case of negative debt elasticity of aggregate demand, ΕD < 0, we can
recognize four cases:  
If the wage elasticity of aggregate demand is positive, ΕW > 0, then: 
(5) When |ΕW|>|ΕD|, we have a wage-led demand.
(6) When |ΕW|<|ΕD|, we have debt-burdened demand (Nishi, 2012).
If the wage elasticity of aggregate demand is negative, ΕW < 0, then:
(7) When |ΕW|>|ΕD|, we have a capital-strike position.
(8) |ΕW|<|ΕD| is theoretically impossible.
Capital-strike position as used by Przeworski and Wallerstein (1988) is equivalent
to the “revenge of the rentier” proposition. In Kalecki’s thesis on the social and political 
implications of permanent full employment (Kalecki, 1943), an increase of the wage 
share accompanied by a decline in aggregate demand could take place if preceded by 
higher output growth and employment that caused increased bargaining power of the 
labor class. This would lead to higher inflation if the pace of the growth of wages was 
outstripping that of productivity, or would result in the increased ability of labor to 
control production. The response of the capitalist class would be a capital strike-cutting 
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production and thereby driving the economy into recession. 
To determine the demand regime in a private closed economy, I next examine 
whether the growth of wage share or debt level is the biggest driver of the growth of 
aggregate demand. 
6 To test for the significance of the cointegration relationship between the 
variables.  I use the t- distribution critical values reported in Banerjee et al. (1998) for the 
speed of adjustment term. 
Estimation of Elasticity 
The testing strategy is to construct a single equation for each of the components of 
aggregate demand in a private closed economy; and estimate the wage share and debt 
elasticity of consumption and investment equations.  I use a single equation error 
correction model (Banerjee, Dolado, & Mestre, 1998) which estimates the relationships 
of time series variables that are integrated to the first order.6  This method has two 
advantages; it deals with autocorrelation in time series data, and it enables testing for 
both short-run and long-run relationships between the variables.  The long-run elasticities 
of the independent variables are calculated by dividing the coefficients by the negation of 
the adjustment coefficient, where both coefficients have to be significant (Onaran & 
Galanis, 2013).  Since the method is only applicable to cointegrated data series, I use the 
Augmented Dickey-Fuller test to test for stationarity of the series.  All the variables will 
be transformed into a logarithmic form, and the series stationarity will be tested in log- 
level form and first-differenced log-level form to check the order of integration.  Given 
the size of the sample, I implement the test with a model of one lag. 
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The error correction method works with variables that are stationary in the first 
order.  As we can see from Table 2.3, all the variables are nonstationary at log-level and 
stationary when first-differenced, indicating that the tested time series are integrated of 
order (1). 
From equation (2): 
∆𝐶 = 𝐶0 + ∆ 𝑌 + ∆𝑊 + ∆𝑁 + 𝑙𝐶 + 𝑙𝑊 + 𝑙𝑁 (2.5) 
where 𝑙 stands for one time lag and ∆ stands for difference.
I ran the regression of the consumption spending equation using Newey-West 
standard errors to overcome heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation problems.  
Consumption spending, income level, and consumer credit are annual data and in both 
real terms and logarithmic form.7  I found the cointegration relationship and the 
coefficients of the independent variables to be significant.Table 2.4 includes the 
statistical results for the significant variables in the consumption equation. 
The significant long-run coefficients show that an increase of 1% in wage share 
would be associated with an increase in consumption spending of 0.35%, which implies 
wage-led consumption spending.  An increase of consumer debt by 1% would be 
associated with an increase in consumption spending of 0.20%.  As will be discussed 
later in the chapter, the importance of consumer debt increased throughout the whole 
period and significantly during the Roaring Twenties. 
The tested investment equation includes capacity utilization, wage share, and 
7 On both theoretical and practical grounds, it is realistic not to include wealth, as 
wealth concentration was very high during this period.  Saez and Zucman (2014) 
calculated the bottom 90% share of wealth to be around 20% in the period between 1917 
and 1930. 
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investment debt as independent variables: 
∆𝐼 = 𝐼0 + ∆ 𝑈 + ∆𝑊 + ∆𝑍 + 𝑙𝐼 + 𝑙 𝑈 + 𝑙𝑊 + 𝑙𝑍 (2.6) 
where 𝑙 stands for 1 year time lag and ∆ stands for difference. 
I ran the regression of the investment equation using Newey-West standard errors 
to overcome heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation problems.  All variables are annual 
data series and they are arranged in both real terms and logarithmic form. Table 2.5 
includes the statistical results for the significant variables in the investment equation. 
Investment spending shows a strong response to capacity utilization as a 1% increase in 
capacity utilization is associated with a 2.67% increase in investment, implying a 
Kaldorian investment function.  A wage share increase of 1% is associated with an 
increased in investment spending of 1.5%, showing that in distributive terms, there was 
wage-led investment. 
Furthermore, it must have been through the channel of consumption that the wage 
share had such an effect on capacity utilization, and hence, investment spending.8  
Investment debt was not statistically significant in the main model. 
Using Kendrick’s (1961) national account data throughout the period, 
consumption was on average 84% of total private output excluding trade, whereas 
investment was about 16% of total private output.  Multiplying the wage share 
coefficients for consumption and investment by their respective weight in private 
spending, I find that a 1% increase in wage share is associated with an increase of 0.48% 
8 The short-term—within a year—propensity to consume based on wage share 
was quite significant; a 0.55% increase of consumption was associated with a 1% 
increase in wage share. 
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in private output,9 while a 1% increase in private debt is associated with a 0.17% increase 
in private output.10  These results led me to conclude that the demand regime was wage-
led, with private debt playing an important role in driving private aggregate demand.  I 
show in the next section that the rise of the importance of debt in driving demand in the 
Roaring Twenties was partially responsible for the instability of the system.  As spending 
financed by debt outpaces the spending of earned income, the economy becomes more 
vulnerable and prone to crisis (Charpe, Flaschel, & Proaño, 2012). 
Furthermore, the investment equation test indicates a strongly demand-driven 
investment function which, given the wage-led demand regime, suggests that a Kaldorian 
model performs well in describing income distribution and demand dynamics in this 
period. 
The Roaring Twenties
It might be puzzling that there is a wage-led demand regime for the early decades 
of the 20th century, whereas the Roaring Twenties (1922–1929) was characterized by 
both rising income inequality and decent economic growth—averaging 4.8%.  First of all, 
the increase in income inequality manifested itself not only in the bigger share that top 
income earners were taking, but also in the increased inequality among wage earners 
themselves.  Furthermore, as Palley (2017) pointed out, focusing on functional income 
distribution, ignores the effect of the distribution of wages.  Even if the wage share did 
9 The change in private output from a 1% increase in wage share is calculated as: 
(0.35*0.84) + (1.5*0.16) = 0.53%. 
10 The change in private output from an increase of 1% in private debt is 
calculated as: (0.20*0.84) = 0.17%. 
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not decline after 1921, blue-collar workers were significantly disadvantaged in their wage 
share compared with white-collar workers.  The wage inequality reinforced the 
absorption of income by the top income brackets.  
Secondly, the drop in demand that could have been caused by the increase in 
income inequality (Keynes, 1936) was compensated for by two channels that sustained 
high levels of demand.  The first was an increase in mortgage debt that financed a real 
estate boom, which drove the economy out of the 1920–1921 recession and then crashed 
in 1926.  The real estate boom was financed by a significant increase in residential 
mortgage debt, which doubled in value during the boom (Table 2.6), whereas demand in 
this period was driven by investment spending, which was predominantly investment in 
residential construction.11  White (2009), using a price index of newly built houses, 
maintained that the real estate bubble of the 1920s was a nationwide phenomenon and 
could be considered greater in magnitude than that of the 2000s.  When using the Case–
Shiller price index of both old and new houses, the 1920s real estate boom is comparable 
to the 1980s boom.  The second channel by which a drop in demand was averted was the 
increase in consumer debt, which financed a consumption boom (1926–1929).  Consumer 
debt increased in importance to finance consumption and reached its highest level of 12% 
of personal income in 1929.  The increase in consumer debt fed into a consumption 
boom, which resulted in demand in 1926–1929, being driven mainly by strong 
consumption spending.  In contrast, real investment was sluggish, registering a growth of 
only 2.18% for the last 4 years of the Roaring Twenties (Table 2.6). 
11 The share of fixed investment in residential structures as an annual average was 
35% from 1915 to 1929.  During the boom (1922–1926) it reached an unprecedented 
50% or greater (Table 2.7). 
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Martha Olney (1998, 1991), who extensively studied consumption and consumer 
credit in the 1920s, demonstrated the role of consumer credit in bringing about the 
collapse of consumption in 1930 (Olney, 1999).  It was the fear of indebted households of 
defaulting on their debts that forced them to cut consumption spending.  In 1930, as down 
payments were a significant part of household income (from autos to appliances, down 
payments ranged between 5% and 48% of household disposable income) this 
development accompanied an increase in layoffs and cuts in weekly hours in the early 
months of that year. 
To avoid defaulting on their debts, the only option for indebted families with 
installment credit—estimated by Olney (1999) to be 25% of all families—was to cut their 
consumption to meet payments and avoid serious wealth loss, since in 1930 default had 
the legal consequences of repossession of assets by the sellers.  Olney estimates the cut of 
consumption required to meet the payments at around 3%, and cites Temin’s (1976) 
estimate of the autonomous drop of consumption at 3.8% in 1930, which implies that 
more than three-quarters of the decline in autonomous consumption was caused by fear 
of default on consumer debt.12 
We can thus see how increasing income inequality combined with higher debt 
level were the main destabilizing developments in the Roaring Twenties era, which was 
ended by the Great Depression. 
12 Romer (1993), using Kendrick’s (1961) national account data, estimates the 
contribution of consumption in the decline of output in 1930 at 46%.  The decline of 
consumption itself was 5.4%. 
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Conclusion
This paper highlights the importance of incorporating income distribution in 
analyzing the dynamics of demand and growth, and also the contributions of the later 
works of Kaldor on the role of effective demand in driving growth. 
The first 3 decades of the 20th century witnessed significant changes in the U.S. 
economy.  There was impressive economic growth, averaging 3.5% annually, and 
structural transformation of the labor force and economic sectors.  Accompanying this 
transformation, the working class successfully mobilized and voiced its demands in the 
first 2 decades, to be crushed in the Roaring Twenties by more conservative 
governments, an antagonistic judicial system, and a successful campaign by employers 
that materialized in the “American Plan.” All of this resulted in diminishing bargaining 
power and an increase in income inequality in the Roaring Twenties. 
Kaldor’s late views offer a consistent long-run demand theory of growth in which 
investment is a derived demand.  Furthermore, in contrast to the neo-Kaleckian and 
Goodwin demand regime models, the Kaldorian model recognizes two possible demand 
regimes in a closed economy; wage-led and debt-led.  Drawing on the Kaldorian model, I 
investigated the demand regime in the early 20th century and estimated both wage share 
and debt elasticities of aggregate demand.  The results show that the demand regime was 
wage-led, with a role played by private debt.  Furthermore, the decline in demand that 
resulted from the increase in income inequality in the Roaring Twenties was compensated 
for by a real estate boom in the first half of the era (1922–1925) that was financed by 
mortgage debt.  Later the economy witnessed an increase in the importance of consumer 
debt, which sustained demand in the second half of the Roaring Twenties (1926–1929).  
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Consumer debt was a significant factor in the decline of consumption in 1930. 
The importance of income distribution and income inequality in economic 
dynamics has been increasingly recognized in recent years, however, the dynamic of 
income distribution and demand as a driver of growth in a Keynesian fashion needs to be 
emphasized.  Furthermore, given all the unstable tendencies of the capitalist system, past 
and recent experience indicates that the path to relatively stable and prosperous growth is 




National Accounts Data 
Output is represented in Gross National Product data from Romer (1989).  
Consumption data are from Lebergott (1996), and investment data are from Kendrick 
(1961).  Fixed investment data are from the U.S. Bureau of the Census (1966).  Capacity 
utilization is expressed as a 1929-based index of the ratio of real private output to real 
capital stock as calculated by the Kendrick (1961) index and reported in Wright (2006). 
Labor Force and Factor Shares Data 
Labor force and unemployment data are from Weir (1992).  In Weir’s data, self-
employment is added to salaried and establishment wage employment.  All annual data 
on waged and self-employed workers are from Lebergott (1964).  Data on manufacturing 
employees are from Lebergott (1964). 
Following Gollin’s (2002) treatment of self-employment earnings, the self-
employed are counted as wage-earners, and the wage share is calculated as: 




Operating surplus stands for profit share.  It equals residual income after subtracting 
wage share.  Earnings of manufacturing workers by skill are from Margo (2006b). 
Debt Data 
Consumer debt data from 1916 to 1929 are from the Bureau of Economic 
Analysis estimates in James and Sylla (2006).  Data for the years 1909 to 1915 are from 
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Nugent’s (1939) estimates.  For the years 1900 to 1908, consumer credit data are 
extrapolated from bank loans data. 
Investment debt data include both corporate debt and mortgage debt.  Corporate 
debt from 1916 to 1929 are from the Bureau of Economic Analysis estimates in James 
and Sylla (2006).  For the years 1900 to 1915, I extrapolated corporate debt data from 
outstanding private bonds and private bank loans, a procedure similar to that followed by 
the BEA in estimating pre-1929 corporate debt.  For the same period (1900–1916) for 
mortgage debt, I extrapolated mortgage debt data on private bank real estate loans as both 
were strongly correlated for the period, 1917–1929. 
Farm mortgage data are from Olmstead and Rhode (2006) and nonfarm household 
mortgage debt are from James and Sylla (2006).  Private debt data from 1916 to 1929 are 
from the Bureau of Economic Analysis estimates in James and Sylla (2006).  For the 
years 1900–1915, I extrapolated private debt data from outstanding private bank loans.  
Private bank loans data are from the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System 
report (1955). 
Deflator Data 
The deflator used for consumption spending, investment spending, consumer 
debt, and investment debt is Romer’s (1989) GNP deflator, taking 1929 as the base year.  
The deflator used to deflate fixed investment and residential construction is from the U.S. 
Bureau of the Census (1966) fixed investment deflator series. 
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Miscellaneous Data 
The value of the new construction of private residential buildings is from 
Snowden (2006).  Manufacturing output data are from Atack and Bateman (2006) 
deflated using Romer’s (1989) GNP deflator.  
Figure 2.1 Ratio of skilled and semiskilled male workers 
to unskilled male workers, 1920–1929 
Figure 2.2 Output: annual growth rate (%), 1901–1929 
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Figure 2.3. Unemployment rate, 1900–1929 (%) 
Figure 2.4. Consumer debt as percentage of private 
consumption spending, 1900–1929 
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Figure 2.5. Corporate debt as percentage of private 
investment spending, 1900–1929 
    Figure 2.6. Farm mortgage debt, 1890–1930 
33 
Figure 2.7. Growth of nonfarm real home mortgage debt (%), 1901–1929 
Figure 2.8. Private debt as percentage of output, 1900–1929 
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Table 2.1: Statistical summary of main variables 
Variable Obs. Mean Std Dev. Min. Max.
Real Output 30 66,45 18,714.81 38,73 103,90
Consumption 30 52,59 11,452.09 33,63 77,45
Investment 30 10,87 3,002.38 6,68 17,06
Consumer 
Debt
30 2,98 1,528.03 687.24 7,10
Investment 
Debt
30 69,26 29,920.89 13,94 129,70
Wage Share 30 59.83 3.71 49.48 64.20
Profit Share 30 40.16 3.71 35.79 50.51
Capacity 
Utilization
30 86.09 7.06 76.20 100
Note. Real output (GNP), real consumption, real investment, consumer debt, and investment 
debt are in millions of U.S. dollars. 
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Table 2.2: Decade geometric mean of output growth




Table 2.3: Variables stationarity tests 
Log-level form 1st Differenced log-level form
ADF statistic
t-statistic 0.05 critical 
value= -2.992
ADF statistic
t-statistic 0.05 critical value= -
2.994









Wage share -2.362 -3.215




*significant at 0.1 level
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Change in consumption 






0.35% (t = 3.46) 




0.20% (t = 3.55) 
(p = 0.0 2) 
 
0.20%
Note. N= 29, Autonomous consumption coefficient: 2.80, t = 3.01, p
=0.007; Speed of adjustment coefficient: -0.74 with t = -4.57 and p = 
0.000; F (7, 21) = 19.78, Prop>F= 0.0000.
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Table 2.5: Investment equation estimation 
1% change in 
capacity 
utilization
1% change in 
wage share 1% change in 
investment debt
Change in investment 










N= 29; Autonomous investment coefficient: -8.02 with t = -3.10, p = 0.005; 
Speed of adjustment coefficient: -0.8.27 with t = -3.71***; F (7, 21) = 16.05, 
Prop>F= 0.0000
*** significant at T = 0.10. 
** significant at T = 0.05. 
Table 2.6: Residential investment and mortgage debt 
Year
New residential structures 
investment/fixed investment









Table 2.7: Growth rates of consumption, investment, output, 









1922 3.68 42.84 5.87 -0.96
1923 9.07 46.60 13.23 4.52
1924 7.41 -20.70 2.96 6.68
1925 -2.92 32.53 2.45 7.99
1922–25 31.09 72.18 24.25 18.23
1926 8.18 6.93 6.49 5.07
1927 2.24 -2.78 0.96 1.71
1928 2.26 -2.32 1.19 14.71
1929 5.53 0.36 6.03 8.54
1926–29 13.7 2.18 14.7 30.04
CHAPTER 3 
THE ACCELERATOR AND THE ROLE OF INCOME 
DISTRIBUTION IN ECONOMIC GROWTH: 
THEORY AND U.S. EVIDENCE  
Abstract
In this chapter, we set up a Kaldorian closed-economy model of demand regime 
that is wage-led and demand-driven.  An important component of the model is the 
accelerator relationship which distinguishes between wage-led and profit-led demand 
regimes.  Taking the U.S. economy (1960–2015) as case study, we explore the historical 
trends and investigate empirically the relationships between profit share and capacity 
utilization and investment.  The econometric test is based on a vector autoregression 
(VAR) model that uses the Toda and Yamamoto (1995) procedure to establish Granger 
causality between the estimated variables.  We find that profit share does not Granger-
cause investment, while capacity utilization does Granger-cause investment, which 
strengthens the case for a wage-led demand regime as a fit description of the dynamics of 
income distribution and demand in the case of a closed economy. 
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Introduction
In this paper we contribute to the debate on the relationship between income 
distribution and growth by presenting a model that draws on the works of Nikolas Kaldor 
(1970, 1988) and the super-multiplier relationship developed by Franklin Serrano (1995) 
and Heinrich Bortis (1997).  In order to shed light on the dynamics of income distribution 
and demand, we empirically investigate the profit share investment and capacity 
utilization of U.S. nonfinancial companies in the last 50 years.  We find that the evidence 
supports a demand-driven investment where capacity utilization, rather than profit share, 
drives investment spending. 
This chapter is part of the broader debate about the role of income distribution in 
economic growth within the family of models that emphasizes the role of demand in 
economic development.  The chapter emphasizes the role of the accelerator in the 
determination of investment.  It is suggested that the accelerator implies that investment 
is derived demand, and as such, it lends support to super-multiplier models of economic 
growth. 
Understanding the dynamics of income distribution and growth has gained 
importance during the recent rise of income inequality.  This problem has been tackled 
with the demand-regime literature pioneered by Bhaduri and Marglin’s (1990) seminal 
paper.  We can distinguish between three groups of these models: neo-Kaleckinan 
models: Bhaduri and Marglin (1990), Goodwinian models: Barbosa-Filho, and Taylor 
(2006), and Kaldorian models: Pérez Caldentey and Vernengo (2013). 
Both the Goodwinian and Kaleckian models recognize the possibility of both 
wage-led and profit- led demand regimes.  The Kaldorian model recognizes the 
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possibility of wage-led or debt-led demand regimes.  The core difference between the 
Kaldorian model and the other two can be accounted by the relative assigned role of 
capacity utilization and profit share in stimulating investment.  Both the Kaleckinan and 
the Kaldorian models perceive the possibility of profit-led regimes, in which higher profit 
stimulates investment.  However, the Kaldorian model objects to the possibility of such 
regime on the basis of investment being stimulated mainly by capacity utilization.  It also 
emphasizes the positive role played by higher wage share and capacity utilization through 
the accelerator relationship in stimulating investment. 
Historically, nonfinancial corporates’ trends of capacity utilization and investment 
share of output is downward sloping, while profits are upward sloping (Table 3.1).  
Furthermore, we implement an econometric test to investigate Granger causality between 
profit share and capacity utilization and investment spending. 
Given the nonstationary or absence of cointegration in the tested variables, we 
employ the Toda and Yamamoto (1995) causality-test procedure.  The econometric test 
finds that the capacity utilization does Granger-cause investment, while profit share does 
not Granger-cause investment which reinforces the view of investment as derived 
demand and provides some support for super-multiplier models of growth. 
The remainder of the chapter is divided in four sections that review the literature, 
present the model, discuss the evidence, presents an empirical test of the accelerator, and 
discusses our conclusion. 
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Literature Review 
Our model draws on the work of late Kaldor (1970, 1988) and the Sraffian super-
multiplier literature of Franklin Serrano (1995), Frietas and Serrano (2015), and Heinrich 
Bortis (1997).  We also recognize the role of government spending and asset prices in 
driving demand.  In contrast with the other two groups of models, that is, the Kaleckians 
and Goodwinian models,13 our model emphasizes the role of autonomous spending in 
driving growth and the role played by the accelerator relationship in channeling the 
growth of output growth into further capital accumulation. 
Although the statement of variants of the accelerator could be attributed to 
economists before John M. Clark (Fiorito, 2007), such as Carver (1903) and Aftalion 
(1987), our literature review will start with Clark’s (1917) treatment of the acceleration or 
accelerator principle.14 
According to Clark, who analyzed data of the U.S. railroad industry, the level of 
demand of net new capital goods depends on the growth rate of the demand of final 
goods.  Harrod (1936, 1939) incorporated the acceleration—naming it the accelerator—in 
his dynamic treatment of the trade cycle.  In his model (1939), he defines a warranted rate 
of growth (𝐺𝑤) as determined jointly by the propensity to save and amount of investment 
required by technological conditions and the producers’ convention of the growth rate at 
13 See the first and the third papers for a literature review of these different groups 
of models. 
14 As we will see bellow Kaldor (1957) distinguished between the acceleration 
principle, which is a relationship between investment level and the growth rate of output, 
and the accelerator, which is a relationship between level of capacity utilization and 
investment. 
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which markets would clear: 
𝐺𝑤 = 𝑠/𝐶 (3.1) 
where 𝑠 is the savings share of output, and 𝐶 is ex-ante increase of capital amount 
required to produce the increased amount of output.   
If the actual growth rate turned out to be bigger than the warranted growth rate, 
then the acceleration principle part of the equation would kick in leading to higher 
investment.  This stimulative effect, in turn, would lead a lower warranted growth rate, 
which Harrod thinks should be lowered as long as it is above the natural rate of growth, 
which is determined by labor growth and technical progress. 
Robert Samuelson (1939) crediting Lavin Hansen developed his own version of 
the acceleration relation as part of his multiplier—accelerator model.  Starting from an 
initial increase of government spending, he introduced lags to the accelerator concept and 
tied the increase in investment to the increase in consumption caused by a precedent 
increase of income: 
𝐶𝑡 = 𝛼 𝑌𝑡−1  (3.2) 
while 
𝐼𝑡 = 𝛽[𝐶𝑡 − 𝐶𝑡−1] =  𝛼𝛽𝑌𝑡−1 − 𝛼𝛽𝑌𝑡−2 (3.3) 
where 𝛼 is marginal propensity to consume, and 𝛽 is accelerator coefficient. 
Hicks (1950), also incorporated time lags in his acceleration principle, but 
differed from Samuelson in that he made induced investment a function of output rather 
than consumption.  Furthermore, he maintained that autonomous investment as 
autonomous spending provides a floor for the decline of output during recession in a 
trade cycle; meanwhile, autonomous investment growth at the trough of a recession 
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provides a stimulus for output growth which stimulates induced investment through the 
accelerator effect. Hicks names this combination of effects—autonomous investment 
effect on output and output effect on induced investment—the “super multiplier.”  As 
output grows, induced investment share of output becomes larger than the magnitude of 
autonomous investment share of output (Hicks, 1950) 
Kaldor (1940) in his theory of trade cycle based the investment behavior on the 
assumption “that an increase in the current level of profits increases investment demand.” 
(Kaldor, 1957) commenting on Hicks model expressed the accelerator principle as “the 
dependence of investment on income through the associated changes in profit 
expectation.”  Furthermore, he pointed out a difference between Kalecki and his model 
versus the other models of Harrod, Samuelson, and Hicks, which is the difference 
between the acceleration and the accelerator principles.  The acceleration principle is a 
relationship between investment level and output growth rate, while in his model 
“investment is assumed to be an increasing function of the level of output, and a 
decreasing function of the stock of capital.” So, while the acceleration principle for the 
other group is based on investment being a function of output growth, for Kaldor, it is a 
function of capacity utilization as output per unit of fixed capital.15 
Goodwin’s (1951) nonlinear accelerator is similar to Kaldor’s in that investment 
is a function of capacity utilization, which is cyclical.  Both Kaldor and Goodwin 
15 Kaldor (1957) maintains that: “It is not correct therefore to suppose that the 
mere slowing-down or the cessation of the increase in output will necessarily reduce 
investment demand.  It would be more correct to say that investment will be checked 
through the gradual emergence of excess capacity which occurs when available capacity 
increases more rapidly than output.  These two conditions are clearly not equivalent to 
each other.” 
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maintained that the problem of the acceleration group of models is that it “regards the 
ratio output/capital as determined by technical factors, which cannot undergo any 
significant alteration, even in the short period” (Kaldor, 1957, p. 836) 
In his late works, Kaldor (1970, 1988) seems to detach income distribution’s 
mediating role between investment and output in the accelerator relationship, affirming 
that higher income per capital stock raises producers’ expectations of higher profit, 
which, in turn, stimulates their demand for capital goods. 
Furthermore, Kaldor incorporated the autonomous spending component of Hicks 
super multiplier with foreign trade serving as the autonomous spending activity, stating 
that, “For the growth of exports, via the ‘accelerator,’ will govern the rate of growth of 
industrial capacity, as well as the rate of growth of consumption” (1970).  Kaldor’s later 
works emphasized investment spending as derived demand. 
Kaldor also employed the accelerator principle in a long-run demand-driven 
growth theory in which “there are no long-run limits to growth on account of supply 
constraints; such constraints, whether due to capacity shortage or to local labor shortage, 
are essentially short-run phenomena” (Kaldor, 1988, p. 157).  The acceleration principle 
and Hicks super multiplier was adopted in part in the Sraffian super multiplier of Serrano 
(1995) and Bortis (1997).  According to Frietas and Serrano (2015), the rate of growth of 
output is determined by growth of autonomous noncapacity creating expenditures—such 
as autonomous consumption.16  It is also determined by the rate of change of the super 
multiplier, which depends on the growth rate of the marginal propensities to save and 
16 In Bortis (1997) formulation, autonomous spending components were 
government spending and exports. 
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invest, and in which “the process of inter-capitalist competition leads to a tendency for 
the growth rate of aggregate investment to be higher than the rate of growth of demand 
(and hence of output) whenever the actual degree of capacity utilization is above its 
normal or planned level and vice-versa.” 
The Model17 
The closed-economy model is based on two identities (balance sheet identity and 
income- expenditure) and a relationship between stock and flow variables.  The financial 
balance identity is a balance sheet identity between stocks.  It states that total financial 
assets (FA) held by the nonbank private sector equal the sum of government debt (GD), 
private debt (PD) (Godley, 1983; Godley & Cripps, 1983). 
The income expenditure identity establishes a relationship between flows: the 
flow of income (Y) equals to the flow of total expenditure.  It states that income (Y) is 
equal to private expenditure of the household and firm sectors (PE), the government 
expenditure (G).  Formally,  
FA ≡ GD+PD (3.4) 
Y ≡ PE+G (3.5) 
The third pillar of the model establishes a relationship between stocks and flows, 
that is, between identities (1) and (2).  Following Godley (1983) and Godley and Cripps 
(1983), it states that the stock of financial assets is an endogenous variable that adjusts to 
income flows and more precisely to private expenditure (PE) with a given parameter (say, 




FA = λPE (3.6) 
Substitution of (1) into (3) and (3) into (2) yields, that the level of income is a 
function of private and government debt.  That is, 
Y = (GD+PD)/λ+G ⇔ Y= 1/λ(PD+GD)+G (3.7)
Specifying functional relations for GD, PD we can obtain a more developed 
formulation for the rate of growth of income. 
Private debt (PD) is equal to income (Y) minus government income (i.e., tax 
revenue, (Γ), and private expenditure, that is, private consumption (C_pr) and investment 
(I_pr) expenditures: 
PD = Γ+C_pr+I_pr- Y (3.8) 
In turn, private sector consumption is a function of income (Y).  By dividing Y 
into profits (Π) and the wage bill (WN), and multiplying and dividing both variables by 
Y, we can express aggregate consumption as a function of income (Y) weighted by the 
wage and profit shares (WN/Y,Π/Y) and associated propensities to consume (α_1= 
marginal propensity consume out of wages and α_2= marginal propensities to consume 
out of profits): 
C_pr = α_1 WN+α_2 Π = α_1  WN/Y Y+α_2  Π/Y Y = 
(α_1 ω+α_2 π)Y (3.9) 
and 
0<α_1,α_2<1  and α_1>α_2 (3.10) 
For its part, investment is modelled as depending on the relation between capital 
and output (Y-κ), availability of internal finance (IF) and the price of capital assets q. 
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I_pr = α_3 (Y-κ)+α_4 IF+α_5 q (3.11) 
where 0<α_3,α_4,α_5<1  and α_3 is the acceleration coefficient. 
The first term of equation 3.7 (α_3 (Y-κ)) reflects the assumption that if output (y) 
is below the capital stock of equilibrium (k), then there is less investment and the rate of 
output growth slowdown accordingly, and vice versa when output is above the optimal 
capital level.  The idea is that there is a normal capital to output ratio that firms try to 
maintain, and that would be equivalent to a normal level of capacity utilization.  In this 
sense, the first part of equation 3.7 corresponds to the accelerator principle.  The 
accelerator says that if capacity is low there is more investment, and vice versa when z is 
high.  In other words, firms would try to adjust capacity to demand.  If that were the case, 
one would expect that a normal relation between capacity and demand would be 
established in the long run (in the neoclassical view, demand adjusts to capacity—that is, 
Say’s Law).  Investment is determined by the adjustment of capacity to exogenous 
demand in order to reach the normal capacity utilization, and it is essentially derived 
demand (the accelerator principle).  As it will be made clear, by joining the accelerator 
and the multiplier (derived from equation 3.9), we obtain a dynamic version of the so-
called super multiplier.  In other words, the level of output determined above is the fully 
adjusted long-term level of output, once the capacity effect of investment is taken into 
account.  In the super multiplier models, the accelerator is not instrumental in 
determining the normal level of capacity utilization, which must be determined by the 
exogenous components of demand (Serrano, 1995; Bortis, 1997). 
The other two terms of equation 3.11 are based on the Gatti, Gallegati, and 
Minsky (1994) framework, and capture the financial aspects of investment. q “can be 
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conceived as the ratio of the price to capital assets to the current supply price of 
investment output, that is an ´an average q´ in Tobin´s terminology.”  The availability of 
internal finance (IF) can in turn be defined as the difference between realized profits (Π) 
and service debt commitments (r_t D_t).  That is, 
IF = α_6 Π - r_t D_t (3.12) 
where r_t is the rate of interest and 0<α_6<1.  Since α_6 is the proportion of profits that 
are reinvested and α_2 in equation 3.9 are the proportion of profits that are consumed, 
α_6+α_2=1.  In line with the formulation of equation 3.8 in terms of profit and wage 
share, equation 3.8 can also be expressed as a function of income and the profit share 
(πY) and debt commitments (r_t D_t): 
IF = α_6 Π - r_t D_PRIV = α_6  Π/Y Y- r_t D_PRIV 
= α_6 πY- r_t D_PRIV (3.13) 
Substitution of equation 3.13 into 3.11 and of 3.11 and 3.9 into 3.8 then yields, 
PD = Y(α_1 ω+π(α_2+α_4 α_6 )+ α_7 Y + α_3 
(Y-κ) -r_t D_PRIV+α_5 q –Y (3.14) 
where α_7 Y = Γ (government revenue) and α_7  is the tax to income ratio. 
Further substitution of equation 3.14 into equation 3.7 with some manipulation 
yields the aggregate demand equation: 
Y=  (α_3  (Y-κ)+ G(λ+1)+ r_t (D_G-α_4 D_PRIV ) 
+α_5 q/(λ-(α_1 ω+π(α_2+α_4 α_6 ))+1)    (3.11) 
In this formulation we can consider G as the autonomous demand expenditure so 
that equation 3.11 can expressed as: 
Y =  (α_3  (Y-κ)+ r_t (D_G-α_4 D_PRIV ) 
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+α_5 q+ G(λ+1))/(λ-(α_1 ω+π(α_2+α_4 α_6 ))+1)         (3.12) 
The term 1/(λ-(α_1 ω+π(α_2+α_4 α_6 ))+1) is the expenditure multiplier.  A well-
behaved multipler requires that 0<λ-(α_1 ω+π(α_2+α_4 α_6 ))+1<1.  The left-hand side 
of the inequality requires 1+λ>α_1 ω+π(α_2+α_4 α_6 ), which is fulfilled since λ>0 and 
α_1 ω+π(α_2+α_4 α_6 )<1.  The right hand of the inequality requires that α_1 
ω+π(α_2+α_4 α_6 )>λ.  This second inequality can be fulfilled as long as the adjustment 
of expenditure flows to stocks is not instantaneous (that is, λ<1).  The condition that is 
λ<1 is meant to capture the fact that the multiplier makes sense only as a dynamic 
adjustment process in time. 
Also the specification of the multiplier is such that multiplier works faster and is 
more potent the greater the weight of the parameters associated with wages rather than 
profits.  In this sense, the aggregate demand specification is wage led.  Table 3.2 shows 
the multiplier for different values of the parameters under the assumptions that the stock-
flow norm (λ) equals 0.5 and 0.4, respectively, and that the leverage ratio (α_4) is equal 
to 0.7 and a scenario where the parameters associated with wages (the wage share ω, and 
the marginal propensity to consume out of wages α_1) take on increasing importance.  As 
can be clearly seen from Table 3.2, in the case where λ=0.5 and starting with a wage 
share (ω) and marginal propensity to consume out of wages (α_1) of 0.2 and increasing in 
a step-wise fashion, both their values to 0.8 and 1, respectively, increases the value of the 
multiplier.  In the case where the wage share (ω) and marginal propensity to consume out 
of wages (α_1) are equal to 0.2, the value of the multiplier is 0.74.  That is, it is a divisor 
rather than a multiplier.  The multiplier reaches 1 when the wage share is 0.5 and the 
marginal propensity to consume out of wages is above 0.5 (i.e., 0.6).  The multiplier 
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reached values above 1.5 when both variables when the wage share is 0.7 and the 
marginal propensity to consume out of wages approaches 1. 
Note that the accelerator term, α_3 (Y-κ), the price of capital assets (α_5 q) and 
autonomous demand G(λ+1) have a positive impact on aggregate demand (Y).  Also the 
debt service on government debt (r_t D_G), which is part of the government deficit 
(nonprimary government deficit) has a positive effect on aggregate demand whereas debt 
servicing of the private sector (α_4r_t D_PRIV) has the opposite effect.  This can be 
rationalized on the grounds that an increase in private debt service is a leakage from 
private sector demand: it detracts from the availability of internal finance for investment 
(equation 8), so that the increased private debt service means less investment, and also, it 
does not increase consumption.  In contrast, for a given interest rate, public sector debt 
service corresponds to the financing of greater expenditure by the government, and 
hence, increased income.  This assumes that government debt is sustainable. 
In summary, in this model, government expenditures as autonomous spending 
propel up a wage-led aggregate demand, while investment is mainly derived demand for 
which higher capacity utilization leads to higher investment.  According to our model, a 
wage-led growth policy is sustainable because the accelerator relationship is prominent in 
explaining investment spending. 
Capacity Utilization, Investment, and Profit Shares 
Long-Run Trends and an Empirical Test 
When we examine the trend of capacity utilization since 1960, we find that there 
has been a secular decline that started in 1974.  Furthermore, we notice that capacity 
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utilization was above average in the 1960s and the 1970s, then it declined in the 1980s 
and recovered in the 1990s. In the last 16 years, it returned to its long-run declining trend 
while maintaining cyclical fluctuations through the whole period (Figure 3.1). 
Nonfinancial corporates’ net fixed-investment share of output followed a similar 
trend; after picking up in 1966, and again in the first quarter of 1980, in the last 35 years 
it followed a declining trend (Figure 3.2). 
The profit share of the nonfinancial corporates after a moderate increase peaked in 
1966. It significantly declined thereafter, reaching a historic trough at 1970, then 
recovered from another trough in 1974.  It witnessed a secular increase characterized by 
cyclical fluctuations that did not restrain the robust increase in profit share, which 
reached unprecedented levels after 2004 (Figure 3.3). 
The secular decline in capacity utilization that took place since the middle of the 
1970s was parallel to the dominance in academic mainstream economists’ and 
policymakers’ circles of the nonaccelerating inflation rates of unemployment theory 
(NAIRU) of Modigliani and Papademos (1975) which originated in the concept of natural 
rate of unemployment of Milton Friedman (1968).  The policy implication of the theory 
of the nonaccelerating inflation rate of unemployment is that there should be “tight limits 
on the rate of economic growth, lest inflation accelerate beyond control” (Galbraith, 
1997). 
This shift in policy and the associated decline in capacity utilization could be 
explained by Kalecki’s (1943) thesis that capitalists tend to be afraid of full employment 
as it might result in increased workers’ bargaining power, loss of control of the 
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production process as a system of capitalist accumulation,18 and the decline in the real 
income of the financial rentier class as inflation devalues their fixed-income returns.  The 
decline of capacity utilization accompanying the upward march of the profit since 1975 is 
not a coincidence. 
The NAIRU policy paradigm, in association with sustained attack on labor unions 
and pursued procapital economic policy, brought about the observed increase in the profit 
share at the cost of lower-capacity utilization and investment, and put into question the 
argument for profit-led growth policy. 
The econometric strategy tests whether the change in investment was driven by 
change in profit share or capacity utilization or both. 







where 𝐼 is nonfinancial corporates net fixed investment, Y is nonfinancial corporates 
output level, 𝐾 is nonfinancial corporates fixed capital, and 𝑃 is nonfinancial corporate 
profit measured as gross added value minus (employee’s compensation, taxes on 
production and imports less subsidies). Given the different order of integration of the 
18 One example of increased workers’ bargaining power leading to proworkers 
transformation of the capitalist accumulation process is the Swedish wage earner fund 
project proposal which was pushed by the Sweden LO labor union confederation.  The 
proposal aimed to enable workers through their union wage fund to buy controlling 
shares of private companies’ capital stocks.  The head of the proposal committee, the 
economist Rudolf Meidner, who was one of the designers of the Swedish welfare system, 
maintained that “the recommended rate of growth of the funds’ assets implied that they 
would control about half of the value of Swedish companies’ shares within 20 years” 
(Viktorov, 2009). The proposal was diluted and modified after the Employers’ 
Confederation counterattack in the 1970s and 1980s.   
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three variables, Granger noncausality test suggested by Toda and Yamamoto (1995) is 
employed.  The method is based on estimating a level VAR with the ability to be 
implemented for variables of different degrees of integration as long as “the order of 
integration of the process does not exceed the true lag length of the model.”  
First, we use the augmented Dicky-Fuller unit root test to determine degree of 
integration.  We find that investment share of output is stationary, while profit-share and 
capacity-utilization variables are integrated at the first order (Table 3.3).  Next we 
determine the appropriate lag length for the VAR test.  We find that both Akaike’s 
information criterion (AIC) and final prediction error (DPE) indicate the choice of two 
lags. The estimated VAR model is stable and there is no serial correlation in the residuals 
(Tables 3.4, 3.5, 3.6, and 3.7). 
When the Toda-Yamamoto modified-Wald test is implemented we find that we 
can reject the null hypothesis that capacity utilization does not Granger-cause investment, 
while we cannot reject the null hypothesis that profit share does not Granger-cause 
investment (Table 3.8). 
Conclusion
This chapter was an attempt to present a Kaldorian model in which investment is 
derived demand, and hence, there could be only wage-led or debt-led demand regimes.  
The data and the econometric test showed that capacity utilization Granger-caused 
investment share of output, while profit share did not Granger-cause investment share of 
output.  The models and the data imply that a policy based on profit-led growth strategy 
should be reconsidered.  Furthermore, a panel-data study of different sets of developed 
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and developing countries at corporate level should expand our understanding of the 
dynamics of growth and income distribution. 
56










1960 Q1–2015 Q3 0.567355 28.74757 5.428864 
1960s 0.609187 28.16226 6.790491 
1970s 0.580813 27.09548 6.726668 
1980s 0.513271 28.12897 5.614147 
1990s 0.631452 27.85686 5.328979 
2000–2015 0.55553 31.12643 3.686114 
2009 Q3–2015 Q3 0.538636 33.60581 3.238649 
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Table 3.2: Multiplier simulations with different parameter values 
Multiplier 𝜆 𝜔 𝜋 𝛼1 𝛼2 𝛼4 𝛼6 
Scenario with 𝜆 = 0.5 
0.74 0.5 0.2 0.8 0.2 0.8 0.7 0.2 
0.84 0.5 0.2 0.8 0.4 0.6 0.7 0.4 
0.96 0.5 0.2 0.8 0.6 0.4 0.7 0.6 
0.99 0.5 0.4 0.6 0.6 0.4 0.7 0.6 
1.00 0.5 0.5 0.6 0.6 0.4 0.7 0.6 
1.03 0.5 0.6 0.4 0.6 0.4 0.7 0.6 
1.26 0.5 0.6 0.4 0.8 0.2 0.7 0.8 
1.41 0.5 0.6 0.4 0.9 0.1 0.7 0.9 
1.47 0.5 0.7 0.3 0.9 0.1 0.7 0.9 
1.69 0.5 0.7 0.3 1 0 0.7 1 
1.79 0.5 0.8 0.2 1 0 0.7 1 
Scenario with 𝜆 = 0.4 
0.80 0.4 0.2 0.8 0.2 0.8 0.7 0.2 
0.91 0.4 0.2 0.8 0.4 0.6 0.7 0.4 
1.06 0.4 0.2 0.8 0.6 0.4 0.7 0.6 
1.10 0.4 0.4 0.6 0.6 0.4 0.7 0.6 
1.15 0.4 0.6 0.4 0.6 0.4 0.7 0.6 
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Table 3.2 continued 
Multiplier 𝜆 𝜔 𝜋 𝛼1 𝛼2 𝛼4 𝛼6 
1.44 0.4 0.6 0.4 0.8 0.2 0.7 0.8 
1.64 0.4 0.6 0.4 0.9 0.1 0.7 0.9 
1.92 0.4 0.6 0.3 1 0 0.7 1 
2.04 0.4 0.7 0.2 1 0 0.7 1 
Scenario with 𝜆 = 0.4 and with half of the profit not consumed reinvested 
0.77 0.4 0.2 0.8 0.2 0.8 0.7 0.1 
0.83 0.4 0.2 0.8 0.4 0.6 0.7 0.2 
0.90 0.4 0.2 0.8 0.6 0.4 0.7 0.3 
0.97 0.4 0.4 0.6 0.6 0.4 0.7 0.3 
1.05 0.4 0.6 0.4 0.6 0.4 0.7 0.3 
1.24 0.4 0.6 0.4 0.8 0.2 0.7 0.4 
1.36 0.4 0.6 0.4 0.9 0.1 0.7 0.45 
1.36 0.4 0.6 0.3 1 0 0.7 0.45 
1.52 0.4 0.7 0.3 1 0 0.7 0.5 
1.68 0.4 0.7 0.3 1 0 0.7 0.5 
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Table 3.3: Variables: stationarity tests 
The Variable Level Form 1st Differenced Level Form
Investment Share of output 
output 
-3.594 - 
Profit share of output -1.300 -7.625
Capacity utilization -1.676 -6.952
Table 3.4: Selection-order criteria
Sample:  1961q1 - 2015q3  Number of obs  =  219 
lag LL LR Df P FPE AIC HQIC SBIC 
0 -622.09 .060506 5.70862 5.72    5.75 
1 278.21 1800.6 9 0.000 .000018 -2.4 -2.35* -2.24*
2 290.95 25.486 9 0.002 .000017* -2.46* -2.33 -2.14
3 298.73 15.56 9 0.077 0.00017 -2.45 -2.26 -1.98
4 307.27 17.09* 9 0.047 .000017 -2.45 -2.20 -1.84
Endogenous Variables: Investment share of output, Capacity Utilization, profit share
           Exogenous:  _cons
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Table 3.5: VAR model test results tables 
Equation Parms RMSE R-sq chi2 P>chi2
ciy 7 .946349 0.8062 919.5779 0.0000 
cyk 7 .009264 0.9736 8141.21 0.0000 
cps 7 .477252 0.9574 4963.631 0.0000 
Note: ciy: Investment share of output for nonfinancial corporates. 
cyk: Capacity utilization for nonfinancial corporates. 
cps: Profit share for nonfinancial corporates 
Vector Autoregression 
Sample:  1960q3 - 2015q3 No. of obs      =       221 
Log likelihood =   292.379 AIC        = -2.455919 
FPE            =  .0000172  HQIC            = -2.325537 
Det(Sigma_ml)  =  .0000142 SBIC            = -2.133017 
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Table 3.5 continued 
Coef. Std. Err. z P>z [95% Conf. Interval 
ciy 
L1. .7580312 .0680608 11.14 0.000 .6246345 .8914279 
L2. .1630566 .0728957 2.24 0.025 .0201836 .3059296 
cyk 
L1. 17.56057 6.856709 2.56 0.010 4.121665 30.99947 
L2. -14.72567 6.94376 -2.12 0.034 -28.33519 -1.116153
cps 
L1. .1750636 .1379638 1.27 0.204 -.0953405 .4454677 
L2. -.1376115 .1361469 -1.01 0.312 -.4044545 .1292316 
_cons -2.259419 1.232962 -1.83 0.067 -4.675981 .1571429 
cyk 
ciy 
L1. -.0017225 .0006663 -2.59 0.010 -.0030284 -.0004166 
L2. .0002011 .0007136 0.28 0.778 -.0011976 .0015997 
cyk 
L1. 1.283306 .0671251 19.12 0.000 1.151743 1.414868 
L2. -.2907832 .0679773 -4.28 0.000 -.4240162 -.1575501 
cps 
L1. -.0023367 .0013506 -1.73 0.084 -.0049839 .0003105 
L2. .001556 .0013328 1.17 0.243 -.0010563 .0041683 
_cons .0347221 .0120703 2.88 0.004 .0110647 .0583795 
cps 
ciy 
L1. -.0963128 .0343237 -2.81 0.005 -.163586 -.0290396 
L2. .009471 .036762 0.26 0.797 -.0625811 .0815232 
cyk 
L1. 2.790677 3.457902 0.81 0.420 -3.986686 9.56804 
L2. -2.864981 3.501802 -0.82 0.413 -9.728387 3.998426 
cps 
L1. .9020788 .0695764 12.97 0.000 .7657116 1.038446 
* Std. Err. z P>z [95% Conf. Interval 
L2. .0558655 .0686602 0.81 0.416 -.0787059 .1904369 
_cons 1.752514 .6217943 2.82 0.005 .53382 2.971209 
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Table 3.6: Eigenvalue stability condition 
Eigenvalue Modulus 
.9969537 .9969537 .996954 
.9207626 + .07200663i . .923574 
.9207626 - .07200663i .923574 
.2950681 .295068 
-.09506567 + .00469898i .095182 
-.09506567 - .00469898i .095182 
Note: All the eigenvalues lie inside the unit circle.  VAR satisfies stability condition. 
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Table 3.7: Lagrange-multiplier test 
lag chi2 df Prob > chi2 
1 10.8789 9 9 0.28410 
2 13.5875 9   0.13777 
3 14.6668 9   0.10051 
4 14.0396 9   0.12093 
5 15.8488 9   0.07011 
6 11.3476 9    0.25263 
Note: H0: no autocorrelation at lag order 
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Table 3.8: Toda-Yamamoto modified Granger noncausality Wald-test 
Dependent variable: Corporate investment share of output 
Excluded Chi-sq df Prob. 
Corporate profit share 2.149983 2 0.34 
Corporate capacity 
Utilization 
12.40325 2 0.0020 
All 16.50828 4 0.0024 
















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































INCOME DISTRIBUTION IN THE US IN LATE 19TH 
CENTURY: THE CASE OF THE FARMERS’ 
PROTEST MOVEMENT 
Abstract
This chapter explores an important episode of income distribution conflict in the 
U.S. economic history through the case of the farmers’ protest movement in late 19th 
century.  It reexamines Douglas North’s claim that the driver of the Farmers Populist 
Movement in the late 19th century was not worsening economic conditions and that 
farmers were not suffering economically.  North uses wholesale prices for farms and all 
products, in addition to farmland prices to conclude that farm products’ terms of trade 
were improving; therefore, he argues, there is no base for farmers’ populist claims. 
I argue that urban consumption weights are not a good representative of farmers’ 
consumption habits.  I construct a rural consumer price index by using Adams’ (1944) 
detailed study of Vermont farmers’ incomes and other historical price series.  When I 
compare farmers’ consumer price index to wholesale farm prices, I find that wholesale 
farm prices declined more than farmers’ consumer prices index.  Furthermore, I explore 
land market dynamics to show that the increase in land prices is not necessarily an 
indication of improved farming income as North argued.  Refuting Douglas thesis 
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reinforces the economic hardship thesis as an explanation of the farmers’ protest 
movement.   
Introduction
The last quarter of the 19th century witnessed massive industrialization of the 
U.S. economy.  The manufacturing sector employed more than 20% of the total labor 
force.19  The available data on income distribution in outside of the farm sector for the 
period is limited, yet suggestive of decreasing workers’ wage share after 1879 (Table 
4.1).  In this sector, workers wage share of added value increased in the 1870s to decline 
in the 1880s and decline further in the 1890s (Edwards, 1943).  The average growth of 
real wages in nonfarm sector employees was 0.9%,20 far lower than average output 
growth rate for the period. 
The farming sector, measured by output or by its share of labor force, was an 
important economic sector for the U.S. economy in late 19th century (Tables 4.2, 4.3, and 
4.4).  Farmers were mainly middle class businessmen, and although farm wage labor was 
an established class by 1900, outside the West, where production was highly mechanized 
and done at large scale, farm laborers comprised fewer than 13% of total farm workers 
(Wright, 1988).  U.S. history in the late 19th century was marked by farmers’ discontent 
as manifested in social and political movements and by a period of prolonged price 
deflation (1873–1896).  The reasons behind the protest movement of farmers in the late 
19 Calculated by dividing production workers wages by the added value. See 
Censuses, 1971 and 1995. 
20 Employees earnings and inflation data are from Margo (2006a) and David and 
Solar (1977), Table 1, pp. 16–17. 
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19th century are still debated among economic historians and historians themselves 
(McMath et al., 2008; Whaples, 1995).  In the field of economic history, the explanation 
of the populist movement used to be based on John Hicks’s thesis in his 1931 book, The
Populist Revolt, which sought explanation of the movement in the economic hardship of 
farmers in terms of declining crop prices, strenuous borrowing conditions, and 
appreciating debt due to deflation. 
In this era, the greatest price level decline happened between 1873 and 1896.  
Farmers blamed this decline on the gold standard and advocated using abundant silver to 
increase money supply and the price level.  Farmers also complained about railroad 
companies’ freight fares and the rent they enjoyed with middlemen by taking over 
processing, transporting, and distributing crops to the final users.  Farmers also called for 
a bigger role of government in stabilizing market prices, and regulating the finance 
industry and the railroad industry (Hicks, 1931). 
Economic historians unanimously accepted Hicks’s view until the rise of the 
Cliometricians, and their prominent figure Douglas North.  North (1966) questioned the 
farmers’ grievances regarding their economic conditions during that period, arguing that 
the available data did not back up their complaints.  Douglas North looked for the causes 
in mainly sociological or psychological reasons, such as uncertainty, risk, and change in 
status.  Although the causes North gave were justified given the structural change of the 
U.S. economy, the declining importance of the agriculture sector, and the sector’s 
integration to the world crops market, I argue that all of these changes were of secondary 
importance to the deterioration of farmers’ income and economic conditions.  For it was 
only the increase in crop prices and incomes that brought an end the farmers’ protest 
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movement after its culmination in 1896.  This becomes evident when we take into 
consideration the stagnation of productivity per acre (Table 4.5) that this era witnessed, 
which meant lower prices for the same amount of products produced within an acre of 
land. 
Literature Review 
Bowman and Keehn (1974) used state-level data of the prices farmers received for 
their products to examine farmers’ terms of trade between 1870 and 1900 and found that 
there was no secular decline of terms of trade or the purchasing power of farmers. But 
there was significant fluctuation of purchasing power, which justified the timing of 
farmers protest waves.  However, the authors used Hoover’s urban price index for the 
period, 1870–1900, to estimate the purchasing power of farmers’ income, which is not 
realistic since farmers did not live in the cities but in rural areas in farms, where primary 
commodities were traded for manufactured goods, a shortcoming I try to overcome in this 
chapter. 
Others such as Mayhew (1972) adopted North’s revisionist stand and speculated 
that the increased commercialization brought to an end the self-sufficiency of farmers by 
the late 19th century and subjected them to market prices.  McGuire (1981) attempted to 
reinforce North’s argument of instability as a source of protest rather than deteriorating 
economic conditions, by showing that variance in income and prices in the data of 14 
states was significantly correlated with the intensity of protesting activity. 
Stock (1984), using state-level data in North Dakota, attributed farmers’ 
discontent in that era to fear of foreclosure on farm mortgages.  Even though Stock 
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blamed economic distress as a reason for the protest movement, he still accepted North’s 
thesis of improved farm income and economic conditions. 
Persson and Sharp (2013) investigated wheat prices and claimed the basis of 
farmers’ discontent was in perceived large transportation costs deducted from the market 
prices of their products, especially grain prices. 
North Explained 
According to North, although prices were declining through this period (Figure 
4.1), using the Warren-Pearson index of wholesale prices shows that agricultural terms of 
trade during this period—till 1890—were upward trending, so farm prices did not decline 
as much as other commodities.  This meant that farmers were “really getting more for 
their money” as the prices of other manufacturing goods were declining more than farm 
product prices. (Figure 4.2) 
Secondly, North used the increase in the value of land as an indicator of increased 
farm income through the period.  Then, to further debunk farmers economic distress 
claims, he referred to the decreased prices of railroad fares, and the insignificance of 
appreciating real debt costs. 
Contesting North’s thesis, I maintain that measuring farmers real relative 
income by comparing wholesale prices of farm products to nonfarm product wholesale 
prices ignores the fact that farmers are consumers themselves and that consumer price 
trends and levels do not necessarily coincide with wholesale prices.  Adams’s (1944) 
detailed study of Vermont farmer prices and incomes for the period from 1870 to 1940 
shows a considerable spread both between retail and wholesale prices, and also in the 
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trends of a group of consumption items.  Furthermore, when I calculate the price of 
deflation for Adams’s basket of consumption goods for the whole deflationary period 
(1873–1896), I find that while wholesale basket cost showed a decline of 76%, retail 
basket cost showed a decline of only 55%, which means the price trend in wholesale 
prices was not the same as in retail prices for this basket, and there was a steeper decline 
on wholesale prices than in retail prices.  And I claim the same trends apply to farmers’ 
income and prices at the national level. 
Adam attributes the spread between wholesale and consumer price indices to the 
wage bill of employees in the distribution chain to final consumers, and the extent of 
monopoly of distribution chains.  This idea is reinforced by the narrative offered in 
Chandler (1977) regarding the rise of the mass retailers in the post–Civil War era.  My 
calculations show a correlation of 0.46 between the spread between wholesale price index 
change and the farm consumer price index change and the change in wages of all annual 
nonfarm employees, which suggests a moderate positive relationship (Table 4.5).  
In an attempt to examine the effects of price deflation on farmers’ economic 
status, I construct a consumer price index for farmers.  I find that the decline in farm 
product prices was much higher than the decline in consumer product prices, hence, the 
farmers did not get more for their money as North argued; second, I argue against North’s 
use of farm land price increase as an indication of improved income and economic 
conditions of farmers. 
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Farmers Consumption Price Index 
In constructing the farmers price index, I made use of the year 1885 weights of 
items consumed by a farmer family as reported in Adams’s (1944) study of the prices and 
income of Vermont farmers, (Table 4.6).  The main sources of Adams’s data were sales 
records of stores, farm account books, diaries, and U.S. Department of Agriculture 
records.  The series covers the prices and wages paid and received by Vermont farmers 
from 1780 to 1940.  Adams presented weights assigned to groups of consumption items 
at 20-year intervals.  For the price data series of consumed products, I used Hoover’s 
(1960) consumer price indices for the period 1873–1880, which were collected from the 
Weeks Report, in which prices were gathered from 40 cities in 16 states between 1850 
and 1880.  
There are no retail price data available for the period from 1881 to 1889, so this 
period is not included in this section. For price indices of the rest of the deflationary 
period of (1890–1896), I relied on Rees’s (1961) price data series which was collected 
from Douglas’s (1930) food index, main retail stores catalogues, newspapers, and the 
Bureau of Labor statistics  data.  If we compare the weights of consumption items, we see 
similarity between Rees’s and Hoover’s weights as they both represent consumption 
habits of urban areas dwellers, while Adams’s weights stand apart to represent rural 
farmers’ consumption habits.  A close look at the three biggest items shows that while 
food weights were similar for Adams and Rees, the other two items weights ( clothing 
and rent) are considerably divergent (Tables 4.7, 4.8, and 4.9). 
Hoover (1960) collected urban price indices for the following items: food, 
clothing, rent, fuel, and light, and “other”—which included medical care, newspapers, 
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soap, and starch.  The price index constructed includes food, clothing, and rent from 
Hoover’s series, and to account for the difference between rents in urban and rural areas, 
I replaced the rent price index in Hoover with wholesale construction price material as 
calculated in the Warren-Pearson wholesale price index.  I justified the replacement by 
Lindert (1988) who maintained that rental income in farms was correlated with wholesale 
construction materials prices.  For medical care, I used Adams’s series, which Hoover 
also used for his index.  Due to the lack of other consistent price series, 10% of the rural 
farmers’ consumption basket is not available, so I accounted for that residual of 10% by 
multiplying the 90% part of the basket by 1.1111. 
So, the farmers’ consumption price index is: 
 𝐶𝑃𝐼𝑓𝑎𝑟𝑚𝑒𝑟𝑠 = ∑ 1.111 ∗ (0.43 ∗ 𝑐𝑝𝑖𝑓𝑜𝑜𝑑 +  0.32 ∗  𝑐𝑝𝑖𝑐𝑙𝑜𝑡ℎ +
0.1 ∗  𝑐𝑝𝑖𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑢𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛  +  0.05 𝑐𝑝𝑖𝑚𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑙 𝑐𝑎𝑟𝑒) (4.1) 
If we compare the price deflation between the urban areas and rural areas, we find 
that for the period of 1873–1880, the decline in consumer prices index was more in the 
rural areas than in the urban areas, and for the period of 1890-1896, we find that the 
decline was almost equal in both rural and urban areas. 
However, in contesting North’s thesis, we are concerned with how farm prices 
fared in comparison to farmers’ consumption basket prices.  Upon calculating the decline 
in the prices, I found that while farm wholesale prices declined by 26.7% for the period, 
1873–1880, and 15% for the period, 1891–1896, the consumer price index for rural 
farmers declined by 22.9% for the period, 1873–1880, and 7.7% for the period, 1891–
1896.  This indicates that the decline in consumer product prices was less than the decline 
in farm product prices (Tables 4.10, 4.11, 4.12, and 4.13). 
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Even for the years between 1881–1889, for which retail price data is missed, we find 
that the terms of trade of farm products were downward trending (Figure 4.3). 
Farmland Prices Issue 
Douglas North (1966), contesting the previous consensus of deteriorating farmers’ 
income and economic conditions as an explanation of the Populist Movement, maintained 
the increase in the value of land this era reflects improved income derived from land 
owned by the farmers. 
However, the increase of land prices should be, firstly, attributed to the expansion 
of agriculture in lower-quality land, which drove up the prices of the higher-quality land 
(Lindert, 1988).  Secondly, land public policy that followed the Civil War encouraged 
western settlement, accompanying the expansion of railroads to the western frontier 
(Hicks, 1931).  Public land policies such as the 1862 Homestead Acts, the right of pre-
emption starting in 1841, and the 1873 Timber Culture Act expanded land in farms 
between 1860 and the end of the decade by threefold in the North Central area and by 
sevenfold in the West (Table 4.14).  It also provided farmers with land tracts either for 
free or at very low prices.  There was nowhere for land prices to go but up.  Furthermore, 
part of the increase in the prices could have been generated by the speculators who 
accompanied the expansion of the railroads.  Either way, the increase was not driven by 
higher farm income.  Finally, land prices at national level declined after the Civil War—
the South being the biggest farmland area through the whole period.  It is not surprising 
that values plummeted during the war and began to rise in the postwar years.  
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Conclusion and Suggestions for Further Research 
Now that income distribution and class conflict is gaining more currency in 
mainstream economic circles, there is an increased need to put distribution and class 
relations in the spotlight.  This article illuminates farming-sector economic conditions in 
response to North’s thesis denying the role of economic conditions as a cause of the 
political struggle of the farmers, who were 30%-40% of the total labor force through this 
period.  I argued that it is not enough to look at the relative wholesale farm prices to 
deduce the conditions of farmers, as they were consumers themselves.  While some 
researchers did take retail prices into consideration (Hoover, 1960; Bowman & Keehn, 
1974), they applied urban consumers weights to rural farmers, a mistake I overcame by 
instead using farmers’ consumption weights as reported by Adams (1944).  This allowed 
me to more accurately explore price change effects on farmers’ economic well-being.  I 
also extended the analysis to the period, 1890–1896, which was an important part of the 
Populist Movement and was not covered by North’s analysis. 
After looking at retail and farm prices, consumption patterns, and the changes in 
the land market, I find that farmers’ protests during the deflationary period had a 
legitimate economic base, especially when we count in the importance of farm credit and 
its duration: 4–5 years (Eichengreen, 1984). 
For future research, in order to obtain a microlevel insight to the economic 
conditions of the protesting farmers in the late 19th century, it would be useful to 
elaborate this analysis by looking at state-level data series for both prices of farm 










Table 4.1: Workers share of manufacturing added value 
















Table 4.2: Percent distribution, of the share of the agricultural 
sector of gainful workers, 10 years old and over,  
for the United States: 1870 to 1900 
Occupation 1900 1890 1880 1870 
Agriculture 
Sector Share of 
Labor Force 
37.5 42.6 49.4 53.0 
Note. Data from U.S. Census Bureau (1975). 
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Table 4.3: Farm sector share of output in millions of U.S. dollars 
Year Farm Sector output* 
Gross National 
Product^ 
Farm sector share of output 
1870 2774 8410 33% 
1880 3263 1106 29.50% 
1890 4298 1344 25.27% 
1900 5780 1858 18.51% 
Note. Farm gross output data from Gardner (2006), Gross national product from Balke 
and Gordon (1989). 
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Table 4.4: Decade average yield of selected crops 
Dec
ade











1871–1880 12.57 26.36 21.08 172.5 739.7 
1881–1890 13.03 25.41 23.28 172.7 714.7 
1891–1900 13.72 26.46 23.92 192.1 756.5 








Table 4.5: Nonfarm workers’ wages versus the farmers’ wholesale 


















1873 -2.15686 -1.25517 -0.90169 -4.11523 
1874 -5.27722 -3.16091 -2.11632 -5.79399 
1875 -5.50071 -5.96935 0.468642 -3.64465 
1876 -6.71642 -3.54859 -3.16783 -4.72813 
1877 -3.76 -1.66259 -2.09741 -3.47395 
1878 -14.8795 -7.49545 -7.38402 -2.57069 
1879 -1.46484 -1.33713 -0.12771 -1.58311 
1880 11.19921 1.568162 9.631045 3.485255 
1891 1.464435 -1.26667 2.731107 1.052632 
1892 -6.59794 0.424809 -7.02275 0.416667 
1893 2.538631 -1.15059 3.689224 -4.97925 
1894 -10.8719 -2.9442 -7.92771 -8.29694 
1895 -1.08696 -1.88713 0.800169 4.285714 
1896 -4.884 -0.88082 -4.00319 0.228311 
Note: Earnings data from Margo (2006a) 
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Table 4.6: Adams’ farmers consumption basket 
Farm Family Living 1865 1885 1905 
Building Materials 10 10 10 
Clothing 28 32 27 
Fire Insurance 3 1 1 
Food 43 43 44 
Medical Care 8 5 6 
Taxes 3 4 5 
Transportation 2 2 4 
Others 3 3 3 
Total 100 100 100 








Table 4.7: Food, clothing, and rent weights in the three series 
 
 Food Clothing Rent 
Hoover 1875 57% 15.2% 17.7% 
Rees 1901 44.1% 17% 22.3% 
Adams 1885 43% 32% 10%* 
Note: Adams (1944) used building materials to depict the cost of accommodation; 
according to Lindert  (1988) building materials are correlated to the rental spending of 
farmers. 
 
Table 4.8:Hoover weights from 1960 
Group Value % of Total 
All commodities and services 726.70 100.0 
Food 417.36 57.4 
All items other than food 309.34 42.6 
Clothing 110.40 15.2 
Rent 128.47 17.7 
Fuel and light 51.34 7.0 




Table 4.9: Rees weights for the cost of living index in 1901 










44.1 17.9 4.5 22.3 7.2 4.0 
Table 4.10: Comparison of consumer price changes 









1873-1880 -20.1% - -22.9% 



















Rural Consumer Price Index 
1873-1880 (base year 1860) 
 
 




































Table 4.12: Rural consumer price index (1890–1896) 
Year 
Rural Consumer Price Index 
1890-1896 (base year 1914) 




























1873-1880 -28.6% -26.7% -22.9%
















Table 4.14: Land in farms, by region and state by thousand acres: 1860–1900 
Year United States Northeast North Central South West 
1860 407213 61082 107900 225514 12718 
1870 407735 62744 139215 189556 16219 
1880 536082 67986 206982 234920 26194 
1890 623219 62744 256587 256606 47282 
1900 841202 65409 317349 362036 96407 











Figure 4.1. Wholesale price index for farm products 




















Figure 4.2. Agricultural terms of trade 1865–1890 ratio of  
wholesale farm prices to all wholesale price 
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Figure 4. 3. Wholesale farm prices/wholesale all prices, 1881–1889 
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